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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This matter is before the Court pursuant to its grant of Appellants, Tracy Cannon's 
and Cannon Associates, Inc.'s ("the Cannons"), Petition for Writ of Certiorari of the 
Utah State Court of Appeals' Decision affirming the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis' Order 
denying the Cannons' request for attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 2001 UT App. 48, 21 P.3d 235. The Utah 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant to UT. Const., art. XIII, § 5 
and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2001 Supp.), and Rules 45 and 51 Utah R. App. P. 
(2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether the Court of Appeals' correctly affirmed the trial Court's finding the 
Cannons were not entitled to recover attorney fees from Appellee Wardley Better Homes 
& Garden ("Wardley") because the claims that Wardley litigated in the trial court were 
not without merit and were not pursued in bad faith. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Cannons correctly state that "on Certiorari [this Court] review[s] the Decision 
of the Court of Appeals not of the trial court." Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24, % 25, 
20 P.3d 876 (quoting Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89,115, 16 P.3d 540; and Lysenko v. 
Sawaya, 2000 UT 58, H 15, 7 P.3d 783). The Cannons, however, over-simplify the 
Court's standard of review in this case by asserting that this Court only needs to review 
the Court of Appeals' Decision for correctness without any deference to its conclusions 
of law. The Cannons' Brief at 1 (quoting Esquivel v. Labor Comm % 2000 UT 66, f 
11,7 P.3d 777; and Bear River Mut Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, \ 4, 978 P.2d 460). 
This Court must initially "examine whether the Court of Appeals applied the 
correct standard of review to the trial court's decision . . . " Lysenko at % 15. 
Furthermore, while legal decisions are reviewed for correctness without deference, all 
factual determinations and any inferences that can be drawn therefrom must be viewed in 
the light most favorable to Wardley. Rawson at \ 25 and Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. 
Russell 966 P.2d 852, 856. 
While the question of whether Wardley's claims were "without merit [] is a 
question of law" reviewed for correctness, Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah App. 
1991), the determination that Wardley did not pursue its claim in "bad faith is a question 
of fact and is reviewed by [the appellate courts] under the 'clearly erroneous' standard." 
Id. (citing Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1104 & n. 5 (Utah 1987); and Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracey 781 P.2d 414, 421 (Utah 1989) (determination of bad faith 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion)). This Court has recognized that a "finding of bad 
faith is a mixed question of law and fact that turns on a factual determination of a party's 
subjective intent." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315-16 (Utah 1998) (citing 
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah App.1989)). Additionally, in 
Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932 (Utah 1998), this Court clarified the 
appropriate standard of review for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56 by stating that "[t]o clarify the matter: As to whether the party lacked good 
faith, the trial court must make a factual finding of a party's subjective intent. In 
addition, the trial court must conclude, as a matter of law, that the action was without 
merit." Id. (emphasis added). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 governs the award of attorneys fees where a meritless 
claim or defense is asserted by a party in bad faith. It states: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except 
under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in 
the action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding 
fees under the provisions of Subsection (1) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
OBJECTION TO THE CANNONS' STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
AND THE FACTS 
Wardley objects to the Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts as set forth in 
the Cannons' Brief because those sections of the Cannons' Brief, misrepresent, confuse 
and ignore the evidence and the basis for the Court of Appeals' Decision . 
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Utah Court of Appeals Decision in Wardley v. 
Cannon, 2001 UT App. 48, 21 P.3d 235, as well as the trial court's ruling denying the 
Defendants' request for attorney fees (R. 1171-77 attached hereto as Addendum A), 
portray the nature of this case and many of the relevant facts much more accurately than 
the Cannons' statement and facts. 
Examples of objectionable and distorted representations include the following: 
The Cannons consistently refer to a fraud perpetuated by Aries Hansen 
("Hansen"), an agent of Wardley. The Cannon's Brief at 2. However, the trial court 
actually ruled and the Court of Appeals recognized that the incorrect dates on the listing 
agreement were different than anticipated by the Mascaros, but only made them voidable 
not void. Wardley v. Cannon, at f 3. Similarly, the Cannons fail to discuss any of the 
time, efforts and expenses Hansen utilized while trying to find a buyer for the Mascaro's 
property during the claimed term of the listing agreement. 
The Cannons also fail to point out that an early Motion for Summary Judgment 
was denied because there were material facts at issue. Furthermore, the trial court 
rejected Motions for a directed verdict at the close of Wardley's case in chief and did not 
rule against Wardley until after "[a]fter four days of 'carefully evaluating the trial 
testimony and carefully scrutinizing the numerous documents entered into evidence.'" 
R.1173-74 
Finally, the Cannons gloss over the fact that after sitting through four days of 
testimony, the trial court took over two months to render a decision. Thereafter, in 
response to the Cannons and Mascaros' request for attorney fees, the trial courts found 
that Wardley's suit was not "without merit" and even though the listing agreements 
entered between Wardley and the Mascaros were voidable because of Hansen's 
misconduct, the legality of the listing agreements consisted of mixed factual and legal 
questions which were not entirely clear. There was no evidence that Wardley knew of 
Hansen's fraudulent conduct, or that it: (a) did not honestly believe in the propriety of 
the claims; (b) intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (c) acted with 
knowledge that its activities would hinder, delay, and defraud Cannon or the Mascaros. 
R. 1173-74 and 1266 (Order Denying Attorney Fees, attached hereto as Addendum B). 
The trial court also found that Wardley's Complaint was not asserted or pursued in bad 
faith, R. 1174 and 1266, and stated "the totality of facts and circumstances don't point to 
[Wardley's Payment of the Cannons' fees] as equitable." [R. 1175]. Because the 
Cannons have not marshaled any evidence or challenged any factual determinations 
below, this Court cannot know the facts and circumstances that support the decisions of 
the trial court and Utah State Court of Appeals. 
NATURE . PROCEEDINGS. FACTS AND DISPOSITION OF CASE BELOW 
This case was originally filed by Wardley against Defendants Leland and Sheri 
Mascaro ("the Mascaros") to recover a real estate commission Wardley believed it was 
entitled to recover because of four listing agreements signed by the Mascaros. [R. 12-15 
and 287-90]. The Mascaros Answered Wardley's Complaint and asserted a 
Counterclaim against Wardley and a Third-Party Claim against Third-Party Defendants, 
Ruth and Aries Hansen ("the Hansens") who were licensed real estate agents affiliated 
with Wardley. [R. 28-39]. Thereafter, Wardley filed an Amended Complaint asserting 
claims against Tracy Cannon for Unlawful Interference with Contract, Conspiracy and 
seeking a Declaratory Judgment. [R. 81-90]. Later Wardley amended its Complaint and 
asserted causes of action against Cannon & Associates, including claims for statutory 
violations and conversion. [R. 277-82]. The Cannons answered Wardley's Complaint 
but did not assert any counterclaims against Wardley nor any cross-claims against the 
Hansens. 
Tracy Cannon filed a Motion for Summary Judgment claiming there were no 
disputed material facts. The trial court denied that Motion because "there [were] 
materials facts at issue." [R. 268-70]. 
This case was tried over four days utilizing the testimony of 14 witnesses and 95 
exhibits (65 of which were received into evidence). [R. 845-46, 851-52, 895, 926-27 
(witnesses) and 847-50 (exhibits)]. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Lewis found no 
cause of action against Tracy Cannon on the violation of statute or rule claims and 
determined that Wardley had failed to meet its burdens of proof on its claims against the 
Cannons for interference with the contracts or conversion. Wardley's other claims, 
however, against the Mascaros and the Cannons relating to the Listing Contracts were 
taken under advisement. [R. 927 and 937-54 Memorandum Decision issued by trial court 
following trial attached hereto as Addendum C]. Those claims were kept under 
advisement for 68 days at which time Judge Lewis issued a Memorandum Decision 
concluding that the Listing Contracts were voidable and unenforceable because they did 
not accurately reflect the Mascaros' understanding that they would be one-day listings. 
[R. 945-51]. 
The Mascaros and the Cannons then requested attorney fees pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56. [R. 972-78 and 979-1080]. Because Wardley's suit was not 
without merit [R. 1173] and because it "was not asserted or pursued with the requisite 
bad faith." [R. 1174-75] the requests for attorney fees were denied. To support that 
decision the trial court stated that the Mascaros and the Cannons "failed to show that 
Wardley's claims under the listing agreements were frivolous or of little weight or 
importance having no basis in law or fact." [R. 1173-74 (citing Cady v. Johnson, 671 
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983)). The trial court also noted "that the listing agreements 
entered into between Wardley and the Mascaros were voidable because of Mr. Hansen's 
misconduct, [but] the legality of the listing agreements, a mixed fact and legal question, 
was not entirely clear. Id.. Judge Lewis explained that her decision was reached "only 
after extensively evaluating the trial testimony and carefully scrutinizing the numerous 
documents entered into evidence, in light of the law." Id.. 
Judge Lewis' Ruling regarding Wardley's lack of bad faith in pursuing its claims 
states "[t]he record does not provide any credible support for a finding that Wardley 
pursued its claims to hinder, delay, defraud, or otherwise take unconscionable advantage 
of Cannon or the Mascaros" and that it would not be equitable to award the Defendants 
their attorney fees from Wardley. [R. 1175]. 
The Cannons appealed the trial court's order denying their request for attorneys 
fees but did not oppose or dispute any of the trial court's factual findings. Wardley v. 
Cannon at fflf 4 & 7, 21 P.3d. 
Because the Cannons did not challenge any of the factual findings or marshal any 
evidence, the Court of Appeals stated "we must 'assume [] that the record supports the 
findings of the trial court,' including the finding that Wardley's suit was not pursued in 
bad faith. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). Consequently, because a 
finding of bad faith is required before a court can award attorney fees under § 78-27-56, 
our acceptance of this finding as true is fatal to [the Cannons] appeal" Wardley v. 
Cannon at Tf 7. 
The Court of Appeals also rejected the Cannons "novel theories of vicarious 
liability" to awards of attorney fees. Id. at ffif 8-11. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. In order to collect attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 
three requirements must be met: (1) the parties seeking fees must have prevailed, (2) the 
claim or defense asserted must have been meritless; and (3) must have been pursued in 
bad faith. Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah App. 1997). The claims that 
Wardley pursued against the Cannons were not meritless and were not pursued in bad 
faith. There were numerous factual and legal issues presented and resolved at the four-
day trial through the testimony of 14 witnesses and 65 exhibits. It took the trial court 
over two months to reach its final decision and after hearing all the evidence it stated that 
Wardley's claims were not frivolous or of little weight or importance having no basis in 
law or fact. [R. 1173-74] (citing Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151). Furthermore, the 
factual determination that Wardley's claims were not pursued in bad faith has not been 
challenged on appeal and must govern the outcome of this case. 
II. The case of Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991) is 
distinguishable from the instant case and does not provide a basis for the Cannons to 
recover attorney fees from Wardley because of Hansen's conduct. Hodges dealt with a 
tort claim that involved numerous factual determination which were all resolved in the 
plaintiffs' favor after trial. It also involved the knowledge and conduct of the defendant 
company's managerial agent. The Cannons' claim for attorney fees from Wardley 
involves complex factual determinations regarding bad faith that were resolved in favor 
of Wardley and a statutory claim for attorney fees based solely upon the conduct of an 
independent contractor. In Hodges this Court upheld the jury's determination that the 
defendant company's managerial agent in charge of determining whether or not to pursue 
criminal charges KNOWINGLY initiated criminal charges against an innocent 
individual Id. at 157-58; lacked probable cause to initiate the prosecution, Id; and 
pursued the criminal prosecution for an improper purpose Id. at 160-61. In the instant 
case there is no evidence, whatsoever, that Wardley, or any managerial agent had any 
knowledge of any improper conduct by Hansen. 
III. The Cannons' efforts to place themselves in the position of a defrauded 
innocent third party are misplaced and do not provide them with a legal basis to recover 
attorney fees from Wardley. In the instant case the Cannons did not rely upon or change 
their position because of Wardley, Hansen or any improper conduct by Hansen. Section 
78-27-56 is punitive in nature and the standards governing an employer's vicarious 
liability for punitive damages should govern the outcome of this Appeal. Tort principles 
of vicarious liability and imputation of knowledge should not govern claims for attorney 
fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
IV. In Utah, attorney fees can only be recovered when provided for by contract 
or statute. The evidence and findings in this case preclude an award of attorney fees in 
this case regardless of Hansen's knowledge. The statutory mandates regarding attorney 
fees should be strictly applied. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 states that to recover 
attorney fees in a civil action the claim or defense asserted must be meritless AND 
brought in bad faith. While questions of merit are matters of law, questions of bad faith 
turn on the "subjective intent" of the party to the action, not the knowledge of a witness 
or independent contractor. There is no evidence in the instant case that Wardley's 
subjective intent amounted to bad faith. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CLAIMS WARDLEY PURSUED AGAINST THE CANNONS 
WERE NOT MERITLESS AND WERE NOT PURSUED WITH BAD 
FAITH. 
A. Wardley's Claims Were Not Meritless 
Attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 "if the 
court determines the acts or defense of the action (i) was without merit and (ii) not 
brought or asserted in good faith." Valcarce 961 P.2d at 316 "to prove a claim is 
'without merit', a party must show that the claim is 'frivoulous' or 'of little weight or 
importance having no basis in law or fact."5 Chipman 934 P.2d at 1162. 
This dispute involved a number of dispositive motions, sixty five exhibits and 
four days of trial testimony. Even then, the trial court needed a significant amount of 
time to sort through all of the evidence before it could make a ruling. Rather than 
provide this Court with the trial testimony or the exhibits upon which the trial court's 
decision was based, the Cannons have relied solely upon the trial court's finding that 
Hansen inserted dates on four listing agreements that were inconsistent with the 
Mascaro's understanding. The Cannons failed to point out the various Real Estate 
Purchase Contracts that the Hansens presented to the Mascaros [R. 847-50] and totally 
ignored the fact that the Mascaros believed they had a contract with Wardley or they 
would not have filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract. [R. 28-39]. The 
Cannons have also disregarded the numerous other efforts and steps which the Hansens 
took to help the Mascaros sell their property. [R. 661-77]. Finally, but perhaps most 
importantly, the Cannons did not provide this Court with any of the trial testimony, 
which formulated the basis for the trial court's decision. [R. 1409-11; Notice of No 
Transcript Requested]. 
In order to prove a claim is without merit, a party must show that the claim is 
"frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." Cady 671 
P.2d at 151. The instant case involved complex factual and legal issues, including the 
alleged modification of the listing agreements, the enforceability of the listing 
agreements, whether the Cannons interfered with another buyer's purchase of the 
property, whether the Mascaros refused to sell their property to a ready, willing and able 
buyer brought into the transaction by Wardley, and whether the Cannons interfered with 
the Wardley/Mascaro listing agreement. [R. 268-70, 271-92, 636 and 661-77]. After 
reviewing all of the evidence, the trial court could not conclude that Wardley's claims 
were "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." [R. 
1173-74 (citing Cady, 671 P.2d at 151)]. This Court should not make that conclusion 
without at least reviewing the same evidence. The trial court and Court of Appeals 
recognized that the legality of the listing agreements upon which Wardley's claims were 
based, presented complicated questions of fact and law which were only resolved after 
the trial court "extensively evaluated] the trial testimony and carefully scrutinized] the 
numerous documents entered into evidence, in light of the law." [Id. See also Wardley 
BH&G at fflf 3 and 8 f.n. 4]. Even without the benefit of the trial testimony and the 
numerous documents upon which the trial court's decision was based, the meritorious 
nature of Wardley's claims should be recognized by this Court by affirming the Court of 
Appeals Decision. 
B. Wardley's Claims Were Not Pursued in Bad Faith. 
Even if Wardley's claims lacked merit, before attorney fees can be awarded 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, there must be a factual finding that Wardley did 
not have a good faith belief in its claims. "Finding a lack of good faith turns on 
subjective intent" of the party and for purposes of § 78-27-56 is synonymous with a 
finding of "bad faith." Cady 671 P.2d at 151-52. See also Taylor, 770 P.2d at 171 and 
Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315-16. To find that Wardley acted in "bad faith" by pursuing 
these claims "the trial court must find that one or more of the following factors existed: 
(i) [Wardley] lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; 
(ii) [Wardley] intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) [Wardley] 
intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, 
delay, or defraud others." Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 316 (citing Cady 671 P.2d at 151). 
There is no evidence, indication or finding that Wardley: (1) lacked an honest belief in 
the propriety of its claims; (2) that it intended to take unconscionable advantage of 
anyone; (3) or that it knew its actions would hinder, delay or defraud others. To the 
contrary, the trial court found that even though Hansen had improperly modified/inserted 
dates on the listing agreements, when all the evidence was considered, Wardley had a 
good faith basis from which to pursue the claims involved in this action. The Court of 
Appeals properly recognized that Wardley's claims did not lack merit and were not 
pursued in bad faith. This Court should do likewise. 
In the Cady case, like in this case, a realty company sued a prospective seller of 
real property for a commission. The trial court in that case found that the realtor's claims 
were meritless and awarded the defendant its attorney fees. The Utah Supreme Court, 
however, reversed and held that even though the suit may have been ill conceived and 
without merit, there was no proof of bad faith which would support an award of attorney 
fees. The Supreme Court explained: 
[i]n the instant case, the trial court found lack of good faith because had 
plaintiffs researched the issue as instructed at pre-trial conference, they 
would have discovered they had no valid claim and they could have saved 
the court valuable time by avoiding trial. We disagree that this conduct 
constitutes bad faith. Plaintiffs were clearly pursuing a meritless claim and 
better preparation might well have disclosed that to them. However, that 
conduct does not rise to a lack of good faith. The evidence must also 
affirmatively establish a lack of at least one of the three elements of good 
faith heretofore discussed. There was no evidence that plaintiffs lacked an 
honest (although ill-formed) belief in their claim; that they had an intent to 
take an unconscionable advantage of defendants; nor that they had the 
intent to, or knowledge that their suit would hinder, delay or defraud 
defendants. 
Cady, 671 P.2d at 152; (citing Tacoma Assoc, of Credit Men v. Lester, 72 Wash.2d 453, 
458, 433 P.2d 901, 904 (1967). Even if Wardley's claims were poorly researched and/or 
ill-formed, its honest belief that a commission was due from the Cannons defeats the 
Cannons' claim for attorney fees in this case. 
H. HODGES V. GIBSON PRODUCTS CO. IS DISTINGUISHABLE 
FROM THE INSTANT CASE. 
The case of Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991) deals with 
a tort claim for malicious prosecution and wrongful termination. In that case four 
company employees went to the police and accused Hodges of stealing from the 
company. The jury, however, determined that Hodges did not steal the employer's funds 
and that conclusion was supported by the evidence. Id. at 157-58. The jury also found 
that the employer did not even have probable cause to believe that Hodges had taken the 
money. Id. at 159. Finally, the jury found that "[the employer] improperly used the 
criminal prosecution [] to pressure her to pay [it] the missing money." Id. at 161. All of 
those factual determinations were supported by admissible evidence. Principles of 
Agency and Tort Law provided a means by which Hodges could pursue her tort claims 
against her employer for malicious prosecution and wrongful termination. Those claims 
prevailed and were upheld by this Court because of the employers' knowledge through 
its managerial agent who had acted within the course and scope of his employment in 
initiating the prosecution. Id at 163. This Court, however, pointed out that the 
manager's knowledge could only be imputed to the employer if his wrongful conduct 
was within the course and scope of his authority and was motivated to carry out the 
employer's purposes. There is no evidence whatsoever, that Hansen had authority from 
Wardley to fraudulently change dates on any listing agreements. The conduct 
complained of here was outside the course and scope of Hansen's authority and cannot 
serve as a basis to hold Wardley vicariously liable. 
Hodges dealt with an employer's vicarious liability for a legal action pursued by 
its managerial employee. In the instant case Wardley pursued a claim which, on the face 
of all the documents that existed and the facts that were available to it, appeared to be 
legitimate. Even though that was not ultimately the case, the information in question 
came from an independent contractor, not a managerial employee. Additionally, 
Wardley, unlike the employer in Hodges, did not have any reason to question or doubt 
Hansen. Because Hansen was not a managerial agent, but instead was an independent 
contractor of Wardley, his knowledge of the altered dates should not be imputed to 
Wardley nor provide this Court with a basis upon which to find that Wardley pursued a 
meritless action in bad faith. The Court of Appeals' Decision differentiating Hodges 
from the instant case should be upheld and the Cannons' request for attorney fees should 
be denied. 
m. THE SANCTIONS OF ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD ONLY BE 
IMPOSED UPON BAD ACTORS, NOT THEDl PRINCIPALS. 
The Cannons' Brief argues that they have been damaged by Hansen's fraud. The 
elements of fraud, however, include reasonable reliance and a change of position. See 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980). Hansen's conduct involved a 
contract with the Mascaros not the Cannons. The Cannons were brought into this lawsuit 
by allegations that they interfered with the prospective economic relations of Wardley 
and because, on the face of the documents available to Wardley, it appeared that the 
commission collected by the Cannons should have been paid to Wardley. The Cannons 
argue that § 78-27-56 is remunerative rather than punitive. The goal of § 78-27-56, 
however, is to send a message that certain conduct is not acceptable within our legal 
system. The award of attorney fees due to the pursuit of a meritless action in bad faith is 
intended to sanction the wrongdoer, similar to an award of punitive damages for 
intentional or reckless disregard of the rights of another in the tort context. Principles 
applicable to vicarious liability for punitive damages, therefore, should also govern this 
case. 
Vicarious liability for punitive damages for an employee's conduct only exists in 
the following four circumstances: 
(a) if the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of 
the act; 
(b) if the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in 
employing or retaining him; 
(c) if the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope 
of employment; or 
(d) if the principal or a managerial agent of the principal knowingly ratified or 
approved the act. 
Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 63 (Utah 1991); (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 217C (1958)). 
None of those circumstances apply in this case. No one at Wardley authorized 
Hansen's allegedly wrongful conduct. There is no evidence that Hansen was unfit or that 
anyone at Wardley was reckless in employing or retaining him. Hansen was not 
employed in a managerial capacity and finally Wardley never knowingly ratified or 
approved of Hansen's conduct. The sanction represented by payment of the opposing 
party's attorney fees should not, therefore, be based upon the simple tort doctrine of 
respondeat superior liability through imputed knowledge. 
The Cannons argued that justice requires they be reimbursed for their attorney 
fees. Justice, however, does not require that that reimbursement come from Wardley. In 
fact, as indicated above, the trial court concluded it would not be equitable for Wardley 
to bear the burden of the Cannons' attorney fees. Justice does dictate that Hansen should 
be personally responsible for any fees, costs or expenses incurred by the parties to this 
lawsuit. The Cannons, however, chose not to pursue a crossclaim against Hansen. Had 
the Cannons pursued that avenue of recovery they may have had a judgment for their 
costs and fees. Wardley, however, should not be prejudiced by the Cannons failure to 
avail themselves of relevant and available legal remedies. 
IV. EVEN IF HANSEN'S KNOWLEDGE IS IMPUTED TO WARDLEY 
AND WARDLEY BECOMES VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR 
HANSEN'S WRONGFUL CONDUCT. THE CANNONS ARE NOT 
ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES FROM WARDLEY IN 
THIS CASE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 provides for the award of attorney fees to the 
prevailing party when the opposing party has pursued a meritless action which was not 
brought or asserted in good faith. Subsection 2 of that code section, however, states that 
the "court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under 
subsection (1), but only if the court: ...(b) enters in the record the reason for not awarding 
fees under provisions of Subsection (1)." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(2). In the instant 
case the trial court entered several findings which justify not awarding any fees against 
Wardley in this case, even if Wardley is charged with Hansen's conduct. Those findings 
included: 
1. Wardley's suit was not without merit; [R. 1173]. 
2. The evidence did not support the contention that Wardley's claims were 
frivolous or of little weight; [R. 1173-74]. 
3. Wardley did not have knowledge of Hansen's fraudulent conduct; [R. 
1174]. 
4. Wardley strongly believed it had a claim for unpaid commissions; Id 
5. Wardley's decision to bring a lawsuit under the listing agreements, which 
on their face appeared to be legitimate, cannot be viewed with 20/20 
hindsight and the benefit of approximately four days of trial testimony; Id. 
6. Wardley's Complaint was not asserted or pursued in bad faith; Id; 
7. The record does not provide any credible support for a finding that 
Wardley pursued its claims to hinder, delay, defraud or otherwise take 
unconscionable advantage of Cannon. [R. 1175]; and 
8. "The totality of facts and circumstances don't point to [an award of 
attorney fees to Defendants from Wardley] as equitable. [R. 1175 and 
1266]. 
The Court of Appeals' Decision at footnote 4 acknowledges that there are reasons 
attorney fees should not be granted against Wardley in this case. In footnote 4 the Court 
of Appeals states that "assuming arguendo that we were to [resolve whether Wardley's 
claims were without merit or pursued in bad faith, the Cannons'] argument still fails. 
Whether the listing agreements were legal was unclear. On their face the listing 
agreements seemed legitimate. The trial court was required to hear four-day trial and to 
weigh a significant amount of evidence to determine otherwise. The record does not 
support a finding that Wardley 4"(i) lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the 
activities in question; ( i i) . . . intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) 
intended to act with the knowledge that [its] activities would hinder, delay, or defraud 
others,' as is required for a finding of bad faith." Wardley v. Cannon, f.n. 4 f 8 (citing 
Childs v. Calahoun, 1999 UT App. 359, \ 16, 993 P.2d 244 and quoting Cady v. 
Johnson, 61 \ P.2d at 151). Wardley, therefore, should not be held responsible to pay the 
Cannons' attorney fees in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Decision of the Utah State Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's ruling 
denying the Cannons' request for attorney fees from Wardley should be upheld. The 
Cannons failure to demonstrate that Wardley's claims were meritless or pursued in bad 
faith defeats their claim for attorney fees from Wardley. Furthermore, tort principles of 
vicarious liability are inapplicable to the instant situation. It would be inequitable, unjust 
and contrary to statute to impute knowledge to Wardley in this case sufficient to justify 
the sanction of making it pay attorney fees to Cannon in this case. For the reasons set 
forth above the Cannons request for attorney fees should be denied and the decisions in 
the trial court and the Utah State Court of Appeals should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted this / I/7 day of November, 2001. 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
Attorneys for Wardley 
Steven B. Smith 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LELAND J. MASCARO, SHERI 
MASCARO and TRACEY CANNON, 
Defendants. 
LELAND J. MASCARO and SHERI 
MASCARO, 
Counter-claimants, 
vs. 
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, 
Counterdefendant. 
LELAND J. MASCARO and SHERI 
MASCARO, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RUTH MARY HANSEN and ARLES 
HANSEN, 
Third Party Defendants. 
COURT'S RULING 
CASE NO. 940907000 
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The Court has before it a Notice to Submit, filed pursuant to 
Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with 
defendants' Tracey Cannon and Cannon Associates, Inc. (Cannon) 
Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Request for Oral 
Argument and defendants/counterclaimants/third-party plaintiffs' 
Leland J. Mascaro and Sheri Mascaro's (Mascaros) Request for 
Attorney Fees and Request for Oral Argument. The Court having now 
reviewed Cannons' and the Mascaros' Motions, Memoranda in support 
and in opposition thereto, rules as stated herein. 
At the outset, the Court notes that both Cannon and the 
Mascaros have requested oral argument. This request is denied. 
The Court is not satisfied that there is a need or basis to justify 
setting this matter for oral argument. Both sides have done a fine 
job of stating their positions in the pleadings and the Court is 
very conversant with the facts, law and arguments. 
In their respective motions, Cannon and the Mascaros request 
attorney's fees pursuant to .Utah Code Annotated §78-27-56. Section 
78-27-56(1) provides that "[i]n civil actions, the court shall 
award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was without 
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith." Under this 
statute, attorney fees may be awarded only if the court determines 
on 
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that three requirements have been met: (1) the party seeking fees 
prevailed; (2) the claim or defense asserted by the opposing party 
was meritless; and (3) that claim or defense was asserted in bad 
faith. With regard to each of these elements, the trial court must 
make specific findings._£££ Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & Son, 808 
P.2d 1061, 1068 (Utah 1991) ("Specific findings further the ends 
of justice by allowing appeals courts to better review the trial 
court1s award."). 
Both Cannon and the Mascaros assert that the Court should 
grant them attorney's fees under § 78-27-56(1) because they are the 
prevailing parties, and because Wardley's claims against them were 
meritless and asserted in bad faith. In support of this argument, 
Cannon and the Mascaros rely on this Court's finding that third-
party defendant Aries Hansen improperly modified the listing 
agreements with the Mascaros. Cannon and the Mascaros argue that 
Mr. Hansen's misconduct should be imputed to Wardley under the 
theory of agency or respondeat superior and that Wardley is liable 
to Cannon and the Mascaros for having to defend against Wardley's 
meritless suit. 
First, this Court does not agree that Wardley's suit was 
"without merit". Specifically, Cannon and the Mascaros have failed 
on 
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to show that Wardley's claims under the listing agreements were 
"frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in 
law or fact." Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
While the Court subsequently determined that the listing agreements 
entered into between Wardley and the Mascaros were voidable because 
of Mr. Hansen's misconduct, the legality of the listing agreements, 
a mixed fact and legal question, was not entirely clear. The Court 
reached its decision only after extensively evaluating the trial 
testimony and carefully scrutinizing the numerous documents entered 
into evidence, in light of the law. Wardley has represented that 
it did not have knowledge of Mr. Hansen's fraudulent activity and 
strongly believed that it had a claim for unpaid commissions. 
Wardley's decision to bring a lawsuit under the listing agreements, 
which on their face appeared to be legitimate, cannot be viewed 
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight and the benefit of approximately 
four days of trial testimony. 
Furthermore, the Court determines that Wardley's Complaint was 
not asserted or pursued with the requisite bad faith. See Cady, 
671 P.2d at 151-52. "In order to find that a party "lacked good 
faith," or in other words, acted in "bad faith," the trial court 
must find that one or more of the following factors existed: (1) 
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the party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the 
activities in question; (2) the party intended to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; or (3) the party intended to or 
acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would 
hinder, delay, or defraud others." Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997); See also Cady, 671 P.2d at 151 (citation 
omitted). The record does not provide any credible support for a 
finding that Wardley pursued its claims to hinder, delay, defraud, 
or otherwise take unconscionable advantage of Cannon or the 
Mascaros. As a result, this Court cannot find bad faith. 
Consequently, the Court determines that Cannon and the Mascaros do 
not appear to be entitled to attorney's fees under §78-27-56. 
Additionally, the totality of facts and circumstances don't point 
to this as equitable. Accordingly, Cannon's Motion and the 
Mascaros' Request is denied. 
Counsel for Wardley is to prepare an Order consistent with, 
but not limited to, this Court's Ruling, and submit the same to the 
Court for review and signature. 
Finally, the Court seeks clarification as to whether Wardley 
is still being represented by the law firm of Nielsen & Senior. 
The Court has received a Notice to Submit filed by the law firm of 
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Nielsen & Senior in connection with their Motion to Withdraw from 
representing the Hansens. While Nielsen & Senior is apparently 
seeking to withdraw as counsel only for the Hansens, it now appears 
that Wardley has retained the law firm of Scalley & Reading to 
represent it in this matter. The Court has received pleadings from 
Scalley & Reading on behalf of Wardley. (See Memorandum in 
Opposition to Mascaro and Cannon's Motions for Attorney's Fees). 
Until further clarification is received and an Order entered, this 
Court will continue to consider Nielsen & Senior as counsel for 
Wardley. They are directed to contact the clients and Scalley & 
Reading to clarify this issue. 
Dated this / ^  day of December, 1938 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
f'jT •: 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Court's Ruling, postage prepaid, to the following, this 
\Q day of December, 1998: 
Steven B. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiff Wardley 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Neil R. Sabin 
J. Craig Smith 
Annette F. Sorensen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Wardley 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James C. Haskins 
Attorney for Defendants Mascaro 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark O. Morris 
Attorney for Defendant Cannon 
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John R. Bucher 
Attorney for Third Party Defendants Hansen 
1343 South 1100 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
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SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Wardley 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. ' 
LELAND J. MASCARO, SHERI MASCARO, ; 
TRACEY CANNON and ASSOCIATES, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. ] 
i ORDER DENYING 
) ATTORNEY'S FEES 
) Civil No. 940907000 CN 
) Judge: Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendants Tracey Cannon and Cannon and Associates ("Cannon") and 
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs, Leland J. Mascaro and Sheri Mascaro 
("Mascaros"), after a trial in the above matter, petitioned the Court for an award of attorney's 
fees from Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant, Wardley Better Homes and Gardens ("Wardley"), 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-56. Memoranda in support and in opposition to 
those Motions were filed and those Motions were submitted for decision. The Court having 
reviewed the Motions, Memoranda, and being fully informed, now makes and enters the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order: 
APR ? 1 19S9 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Both Cannons and Mascaros claimed a right to attorney's fees pursuant 
to Section 78-27-56 (1) contending that Wardley's claims were meritless and asserted in bad 
faith. 
2. Wardley's claims, however, were not "without merit." 
3. Even though the listing agreements entered between Wardley and the 
Mascaros were voidable because of the misconduct of Arlis Hansen, the legality of the listing 
agreements consisted of mixed factual and legal questions which were not entirely clear. 
There was no evidence presented that Wardley independently knew of Mr. Hansen's 
fraudulent conduct, and there was evidence that Wardley strongly believed that it had a valid 
claim for unpaid commissions. The evidence indicated: (a) Wardley had an honest belief in 
the propriety of the activities in question; (b) Wardley did not intend to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; and (c) Wardley did not intend to or act with knowledge that its 
activities would hinder, delay, and defraud Cannon or the Mascaros. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Cannon and Mascaros failed to demonstrate that Wardley's claims were 
"frivolous," or "of little weight or importance, having no basis in law or fact" as set forth in 
Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
2. Wardley's Complaint was not asserted or pursued in bad faith. 
3. The totality of facts and circumstances would make it inequitable to 
force Wardley to pay Cannons' and Mascaros' attorney's fees. 
%<tylofl> 
DATED this 2A dayofMarchrl999. 
By the Court: 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
I hereby certify that on the 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
\8& day of March, 1999, a true and correct copy of 
Wardley's Order Denying Attorney's Fees was deposited in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
James C. Haskins, Esq. 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES 
357 South 200 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark O. Morris, Esq. 
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
John Bucher, Esq. 
1343 South 1100 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, : 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LELAND J. MASCARO, et 
Defendants. 
LELAND J. MASCARO and 
MASCARO, 
Counter-claimants, 
vs. 
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES £ 
Counterdefendant. 
LELAND J. MASCARO and 
MASCARO, 
al., : 
SHERI 
. GARDENS, : 
SHERI 
Third Party Plaintiffs, : 
vs. 
RUTH MARY HANSEN and ARLES HANSEN, 
Third Party Defendants. : 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 940907000 
This case came before the Court for trial beginning on June 8, 
1998, and continuing through June 11, 1998. The Court having 
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received testimony and heard argument from counsel, ruled from the 
bench that the plaintiffs had not established a cause of action 
against defendant Tracy Cannon with respect to their claim that 
defendant Tracy Cannon's conduct violated the Utah Administrative 
Code. Specifically, the Court found that defendant Tracy Cannon's 
conduct was not unprofessional or unethical under the totality of 
the facts and circumstances and based upon the testimony of certain 
witnesses, including defendant Tracy Cannon and Rodney "Butch" 
Dailey, whom the Court found to be credible. The Court also ruled 
that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proof in connection 
with their claim that defendant Tracy Cannon intentionally 
interfered with the plaintiff's prospective economic relations with 
respect to the Wetcor/Michael Ahlin deal, the Michael 
Brodsky/Hamlet Development deal and the Boulder deal (see factual 
discussion below). Further, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs 
had not met their burden of proof as to their claim that defendant 
Cannon's failure to remit the commissions on the sale of the 
defendant Mascaros' property to the plaintiff constituted 
conversion. The remaining issues raised in the Second Amended 
Complaint, the Counterclaim, and the Third Party Complaint were 
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taken under advisement by the Court for further, more in-depth 
consideration. 
FACTUAL 3ACKGRQVND 
This Court finds that credible testimony adduced at trial, 
establishes the following facts. The Mascaros ("Mascaros") 
defendants and third-party plaintiffs, were first contacted by 
third-party defendant Aries Hansen ("Mr. Hansen") in the summer of 
1993. Mr. Hansen, who represented himself to be the agent of the 
plaintiff and counterdefendant Wardley Better Homes & Gardens 
("Wardley"), inquired whether the Mascaros were interested in 
selling approximately 128 acres of real property which is the 
subject of this lawsuit. Mr. Hansen informed the Mascaros that he 
was looking for property in that area for Michael L. Ahlin ("Mr. 
Ahlin"), President of Impact Development Corporation d/b/a Wetcor. 
After his initial meeting with the Mascaros, Mr. Hansen met 
with defendant and third-party plaintiff Sheri Mascaro ("Mrs. 
Mascaro") and requested that she sign an Option agreement. Mrs. 
Mascaro signed, but did not date, the Option agreement (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1). The terms of this Option agreement included a 20 day 
duration and gave Mr. Hansen, and his wife, third-party defendant 
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Ruth Mary Hansen ("Mrs. Hansen"), or their assigns, the right to 
purchase the Mascaros' property. 
When Mr. Hansen discovered that defendant and third-party 
plaintiff Leland Mascaro ("Mr. Mascaro") was the actual owner of 
the property, he asked the Mascaros to sign a second Option 
agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). The terms of the second Option 
agreement, dated September 14, 1993, were identical to the first 
Option agreement and was signed by both the Mascaros. According to 
the trial testimony, it was also on this date that Mrs. Mascaro 
informed Mr. Hansen that Century 21 All West Inc. ("Century 21") 
had an exclusive listing agreement on the property. The Century 21 
listing agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 30) had been signed by Mr. 
Mascaro on May 28, 1993, and provided for a six month duration. 
The Court found Mr. Hansen's testimony that he was not aware of the 
Century 21 agreement was lacking in credibility. To the contrary, 
the Court finds that the Century 21 agreement was disclosed to Mr. 
Hansen and that he requested Mrs. Mascaro to obtain a one-party 
exemption from Mr. Jerard Dinkelman, the principal broker under the 
Century 21 Agreement. Mrs. Mascaro obtained the exemption 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 29) on September 14, 1993. This exemption was 
acquired before the second Option agreement was executed. 
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It further appears from the testimony that when Mr. Ahlin did 
not make an immediate offer, Mr. Hansen engaged in other actions 
with the Mascaros, including having them write a letter 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3), dated October 6, 1993, to put pressure on 
Mr. Ahlin to make the deal. Mrs. Mascaro conceded at trial that 
this letter, stating that she and her husband had been contacted by 
another developer offering ernest money on the parcels, was a 
fabrication. 
On October 12, 1993, Mr. Ahlin made an offer on the property 
through a Real Estate Purchase Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) of 
the same date. In addition to the Real Estate Purchase Contract, 
Mr. Hansen prepared a Dual Agency Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) 
which was signed by Mr. Ahlin and Mrs. Hansen. The Court finds 
this Agreement is significant because Mr. Hansen had continuously 
represented to the Mascaros that he was their agent exclusively. 
In addition, Mr. Rod Gordon testified that he was Mr. Ahlin's agent 
and that it was inappropriate for the Hansens to present a Dual 
Agency Agreement for Mr. Ahlin's consideration and signature. Also 
of significance is the Sales Agency Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
4) which the Hansens prepared for the Mascaros' signature. A hand-
written notation on the top of this contract expressly states that 
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it is a single party listing and that the single party is Wetcor. 
All of these documents were sent to the Mascaros and to their legal 
counsel, Mr. Mitch Olsen. Mr. Olsen testified that he advised the 
Mascaros not to sign the documents and offered to draft an original 
real estate purchase contract which included a provision for 
commission to be paid to the Hansens in the event that Mr. Ahlin 
consummated the purchase of the property (Plaintiff's Exhibit 16). 
Based on Mr. Olsen's advice, the Mascaros did not act on Mr. 
Ahlin's offer but continued to negotiate with him. In addition, 
the testimony is clear that no listing agreement was ever executed 
or contemplated by the Mascaros at that time. 
On November 14, 1993, Mr. Hansen came to the Mascaros' home 
with a number of documents. At this meeting, Mr. Hansen brought an 
Option Agreement (Defendant's Exhibit 89), a Limited Agency 
Disclosure Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), a blank Real Estate 
Purchase Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), and four listing 
agreements (''Listing Agreements") with Salt Lake Board of Realtors 
Land Data Input Forms (Plaintiff's Exhibits 17 - 20). In his 
testimony, Mr. Hansen acknowledged that in preparing these 
documents the night before, he had predated many of them. The 
Court finds that Mr. Hansen's preparation of these documents was 
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unsolicited and that Mr. Hansen purposely met with the Mascaros on 
a Sunday without the presence of their legal counsel. It appears 
to the Court that Mr. Hansen's urgency in preparing these documents 
and having the Mascaros sign them was based on the expiration of 
the second Option agreement. It further appears from the Mascaros' 
testimony that Mr. Hansen's scheme was to have the Mascaros present 
an offer to Mr. Ahlin with the expectation that he would purchase 
a small portion of the acreage and agree to an option on the 
remainder of the land. However, because the Mascaros and Mr. 
Hansen did not yet know how many acres Mr. Ahlin would actually be 
willing to purchase, the principle terms of the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract were left blank. In addition, only the first of 
the four Listing Agreements contained an expiration date. 
The Court finds that the first Listing Agreement (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 17A) , in its unaltered state, reflects the actual agreement 
between the Mascaros and Mr. Hansen. This Listing Agreement was 
set to expire on November 15, 1993, one day after Mr. Hansen's 
Sunday meeting with the Mascaros. The Court finds that Mr. Hansen 
altered the date on this Listing Agreement from November 15, 1993 
to November 15, 1994. This finding is based on the credible 
testimony of the Mascaros and the Court's comparison of documents 
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where changes are initialed (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), with the 
Listing Agreement marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 17A, where the 
change in the expiration date has no initials. The Court further 
finds that with respect to the other three Listing Agreements, 
which were blank with respect to the expiration dates, these were 
filled in by Mr. Hansen, subsequent to the Mascaros' signature, 
with "November 14, 1994" dates. The credible testimony established 
that Mr. Hansen's conduct in changing and/or writing in the 
expiration dates, was engaged in without the knowledge and the 
approval of the Mascaros. In addition, the dates alluded to and 
written by Mr. Hansen were contrary to the parties' agreement and 
clear understanding that the Listing Agreements would expire in one 
day. 
This Court also finds that Mr. Ahlin did subsequently sign 
both the Option Agreement and the Real Estate Purchase Contract, 
and Mrs. Hansen accepted an earnest money check for $4,000. 
Further, it is clear that the deal between the Mascaros and Mr. 
Ahlin subsequently failed. After an attempt to arbitrate the 
matter of the earnest money, the title company released the $4,000 
earnest money to Mr. Ahlin's assignees. 
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This Court also finds that around this same time, another 
potential purchaser of the property, Michael Brodsky, President of 
Hamlet Development, began to negotiate with the Mascaros. Mr. 
Brodsky testified that he proposed purchasing the property in 
stages and thought that he and the Mascaros had reached a verbal 
agreement on the sale. However, before the agreement was 
finalized, Mr. Brodsky was informed by the Mascaros that a sale of 
the property had occurred. In September 1994, the Mascaros 
signed a one year listing agreement with defendant Cannon 
Associates. In October 1994, the Mascaros signed a Real Estate 
Purchase Agreement agreeing to sell the property to defendant 
Tracey Cannon ("Ms. Cannon") . The Mascaros and Ms. Cannon closed 
on this property on May 11, 1995. Ms. Cannon received a commission 
from the sale of $115,338.16. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The Court determines that the listing- agreements entered 
Into between Wardley and the Mascaros are voidable 
because they were secured by fraud in the inducement. 
In its Second Amended Complaint, Wardley claims that the 
Mascaros have breached their Listing Agreements with Wardley by 
refusing to pay Wardley the 7% commission provided for in the 
Listing Agreements upon the sale of the property to Ms. Cannon. 
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Wardley argues that the sale to Ms. Cannon was entered into within 
the one-year term of the Listing Agreements. According to Wardley, 
when the sale on the property to Ms. Cannon closed, the contractual 
requirements for Wardley's earned commission had been satisfied. 
In their Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint against 
Wardley and the Hansens, the Mascaros contend they were induced to 
sign the Listing Agreements in reliance on false representations 
made to them by Mr. Hansen. The representations which the Mascaros 
claim were fraudulent are: (1) that Mr. Hansen told them that he 
would only receive a commission for the sale of the Mascaros' 
property to Wetcor if they signed the Listing Agreements and (2) 
that the Listing Agreements would be valid for only one day and 
would apply only to the Wetcor purchase. The Mascaros also claim 
that Wardley breached its contract with them by failing to list the 
property on the MLS, and by failing to appropriately market the 
property. 
Under Utah law, a person may rely upon positive assertions 
made by another, Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980), 
and fraud in the inducement may allow the injured party to avoid 
the contract. Berkely Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 
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798, 801-04 (Utah 1980). The nine essential elements of fraudulent 
inducement (fraud) are: 
"(1) that a representation was made; (2) 
concerning a presently existing material fact; 
(3) which was false; (4) which the representor 
either (a) knew to be false or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) 
that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely 
upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act 
(9) to his injury and damage." 
Meibos, 607 P.2d at 800. 
The Court determines that the Mascaros have proven fraudulent 
inducement because they have presented evidence supporting all of 
its elements. This Court finds most significant the fact that 
there are inconsistencies between the written terms of the Listing 
Agreements and the Mascaros' expressed intention to limit Mr. 
Hansen's representation to the Ahlin/Wetcor deal and to limit the 
duration of his representation to one day. These inconsistencies 
can only be reconciled with a finding that Mr. Hansen fraudulently 
represented that the Listing Agreements would be limited to one-
party and would expire in one day to induce the Mascaros to sign 
the Listing Agreements. As part of his fraudulent scheme, the 
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Court finds that Mr, Hansen altered the November 15, 1993, date 
which was originally found on the first Listing Agreement and added 
expiration dates to the remaining three Listing Agreements to 
reflect an unagreed and unintended one-year duration. It appears 
Mr. Hansen unilaterally modified the Listing Agreements to 
improperly expand the scope of his representation beyond that 
contemplated by the Mascaros. The Court finds that Mr. Hansen's 
modifications were made without the Mascaros' knowledge and at a 
time when they did not have counsel available on the benefit of 
necessary legal advice. Based on the Mascaros' testimony, which 
the Court found to be credible, they were induced into signing 
incomplete drafts of the Listing Agreements during a Sunday 
meeting, when their legal counsel was apparently unavailable, 
because of Mr. Hansen's representation that it was the only way for 
him to receive a commission on the deal and his assurances that the 
final version of the Listing Agreements would contain the 
limitations they had discussed. In addition, the Mascaros' 
testified that they failed to take any additional precautions such 
as filling out the blank spaces because of their belief that Mr. 
Hansen had their best interests in mind. On this topic, the Court 
found Mrs. Mascaro's statement that "blind trust walked in and care 
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walked out" to be a particularly compelling statement concerning 
the Mascaros' reliance upon Mr. Hansen's representations and the 
opportunity for deception by Mr. Hansen. The Court finds that Mr. 
Hansen took full advantage of this opportunity by arriving for a 
hastily scheduled meeting with the Mascaros, whom Mr. Hansen knew 
to be represented by legal counsel, on a Sunday, when counsel would 
be unlikely to be available. 
Overall, the Court found that the Mascaros' belief that they 
were operating under a one-day, one-party listing agreement was 
corroborated by documents received into evidence and the totality 
of credible trial testimony. For instance, the Sale Agency 
Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) presented to the Mascaros and 
signed by Mrs. Hansen imparts the Hansens' acknowledgment of the 
Mascaros' expressed intention to limit the Hansens' listing to "a 
single party listing . . . The single party is Wetcor." Further, 
the Court finds that Mr. Hansen was aware of the Century 21 Listing 
and was fully cognizant he could represent the Mascaros only if he 
could obtain a one-party exemption. Mr. Hansen's request that Mrs. 
Mascaro obtain a one-party exemption from Century 21 is congruent 
with the Mascaros' express reservations that their listing 
agreement with the Hansens be limited to the Ahlin/Wetcor deal and 
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with the Hansens' recognition that their representation had to be 
limited to one-party so as not run afoul of the Century 21 Listing. 
Next, it is significant to the Court that the change in the 
expiration date on the first Listing Agreement was not initialed. 
When compared to other documents where changes were initialed by 
the Mascaros, the lack of initials on the altered expiration date 
strongly suggests to the Court that the date was modified after the 
Mascaros signed this Listing Agreement and without their knowledge 
or permission. The Hansens' actions and the trail of documents 
speak loudly and convincingly that the Mascaros signed the Listing 
Agreements only because of Mr. Hansen's fraudulent 
misrepresentations and false assurances concerning the duration and 
scope of these agreements. In reaching this determination, the 
Court has given due consideration to all of the evidence, including 
the Mascaros' confessed lack of expertise in real estate matters 
and the particular facts surrounding Mr. Hansen's insistence that 
they sign the Listing Agreements on a Sunday, when they did not 
have access to their legal counsel. The existence of these proven 
facts in this case defeats Wardley's recovery upon the Listing 
Agreements. This Court concludes it would be inequitable, would be 
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unjust, and unlawful for this Court to enforce agreements, procured 
through fraudulent inducement. 
The Court notes that there are also other possible grounds on 
which the Mascaros could avoid liability under the Listing 
Agreements, including the doctrine of mistake. However, since the 
Court finds that the Listing Agreements are voidable on the grounds 
of fraudulent inducement, the Court deems it unnecessary to 
consider alternative theories. 
To summarize, the Court rules against Wardley on its claim 
that the Mascaros breached the Listing Agreements. Specifically, 
the Court rules that the Listing Agreements are unenforceable. 
Further, the Court rules against Wardley on its claim that Ms. 
Cannon interfered with Wardley' s economic relations with respect to 
the Mascaros. Since the Listing Agreements were unenforceable, 
Wardley did not have viable economic relations with the Mascaros, 
with which Ms. Cannon could interfere. 
With respect to the Mascaros' Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint, the Court's ruling that the Listing Agreements are 
unenforceable renders moot the Mascaros' claim that they are 
entitled to attorney's fees and costs as specified within the terms 
of the Listing Agreements. In other words, in disaffirming the 
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terms of the Listing Agreements, the Mascaros cannot seek to 
selectively reinstate only certain portions of the Listing 
Agreements which are favorable to them. The same concept applies 
to the Mascaros' claim that Wardley breached the terms of the 
Listing Agreements. As stated previously, since fraudulent 
inducement has been proven, the terms of the Listing Agreement are 
not enforceable or binding on either the Mascaros or Wardley. In 
so ruling, the Court has essentially placed the Mascaros in the 
same position that they were in before the Listing Agreements were 
executed. 
With respect to the Mascaros' claim for damages on fraud, it 
is this Court's view that the Mascaros have been restored to their 
former position by this Court's determination that the Listing 
Agreements are void. Moreover, while the Mascaros may have 
suffered emotional angst over the Hansens' conduct and whether 
their property would be sold, there is no evidence that this 
distress resulted in any compensatory damages. As a corollary, the 
Mascaros have not presented any evidence that they have suffered a 
pecuniary loss, particularly in light of their sale of the property 
to Ms. Cannon under more beneficial terms than were offered by the 
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Ahlin/Wetcor deal. Accordingly, the Court denies the Mascaros' 
claim for damages. 
Counsel for the Mascaros is to prepare an Order and Findings 
consistent with, but not limited to the content of this Ruling 
within fifteen (15) days. 
Dated this r~~Xx/d^y-of^August,^1998 , 
"tr 
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LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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